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Abstract—The concept of agile domain name system (DNS)
refers to dynamic and rapidly changing mappings between
domain names and their Internet protocol (IP) addresses. This
empirical paper evaluates the bias from this kind of agility
for DNS-based graph theoretical data mining applications. By
building on two conventional metrics for observing malicious
DNS agility, the agility bias is observed by comparing bipartite
DNS graphs to different subgraphs from which vertices and edges
are removed according to two criteria. According to an empirical
experiment with two longitudinal DNS datasets, irrespective of
the criterion, the agility bias is observed to be severe particularly
regarding the effect of outlying domains hosted and delivered via
content delivery networks and cloud computing services. With
these observations, the paper contributes to the research domains
of cyber security and DNS mining. In a larger context of applied
graph mining, the paper further elaborates the practical concerns
related to the learning of large and dynamic bipartite graphs.
Index Terms—content delivery network, fast flux, fluxiness,
bipartite graph, dynamic network, botnet, DNS, CDN, IPv6
I. INTRODUCTION
The terms DNS agility and agile DNS refer to highly
dynamic mappings between fully qualified domain names
(FQDNs) and Internet protocol (IP) addresses [1]. This empiri-
cal paper examines the biases from this kind of agility for data
mining that operates with DNS graphs comprised of addresses,
domains, and links (edges) between addresses and domains.
Content delivery networks (CDNs), as pioneered particu-
larly by Akamai Technologies, Inc., have had a significant
impact upon this type of DNS agility. In order to improve re-
liability and efficiency, these networks essentially distribute the
payload both across multiple servers and geographically across
multiple locations. In a sense, therefore, CDNs can be viewed
as a visible historical milestone in the emergence of cloud
computing, the critical juncture having been located in the
late 1990s and early 2000s during which Akamai introduced
its core commercial technologies. Although the company’s
infrastructural empire has grown ever since—currently cover-
ing over two hundred thousand servers around the globe [2],
the core DNS solution is still based on the same underlying
rationale. In a nutshell: a client’s DNS query is used to route
the client to a topologically nearest and generally optimal
caching edge server, provided that the queried domain has
joined to a CDN by pointing its name servers to those provided
by the CDN orchestrator [3], [4], [5]. While CDNs have
been extensively studied in the fields of communications and
computer networks, a different kind but still empirically highly
similar DNS agility has been at the center of empirical DNS
mining applications motivated by cyber security questions.
The malicious use of DNS became widely known by the
late 2000s detection of a botnet that generated domain names
dynamically. While the botnet used a traditional worm-like
propagation to spread, it had a centralized command and con-
trol unit to which the bots connected with their daily routines
for seeking out the pseudo-random domain names [6]. Around
the same time, also the so-called fast flux service networks
became widely known. While botnets have adopted fast flux
algorithms, the phenomenon itself generalizes to CDN-like
distributed proxy networks built on top of compromised hosts,
which via DNS redirect the traffic to central hosts that serve
the actual malicious web or other content [4]. In this paper,
the study of agile DNS is motivated by revisiting two well-
known [4], [7] metrics for observing the behavior of fast
flux networks and their hypothesized empirical differences to
CDNs and other legitimate DNS-based networking solutions.
The agility bias is operationalized with two criteria that
emphasize the statistical effects upon the learning and under-
lying structure of DNS graphs. In essence, the first question
examined in the empirical experiment is simple: (a) how
many DNS resolving rounds are roughly required to attain
a representative DNS graph? If many rounds are required,
it follows that there is a “learning bias” for graphs learned
with only one or few rounds. In other words, there would be
many false negative vertices (absence of vertices that should
be present) and false negative edges (missing of relations
that should be present) [8]. The second question examines a
different kind of a “sampling bias”: (b) what is the effect of
extremely agile domains upon the statistical characteristics of
already learned DNS graphs? While the first question relates
to obtaining a statistically representative sample, the sampling
bias is best understood as a question about the impact of
outliers for the structure of a DNS graph. Here, an outlier
is understood broadly as a graph object that is rare and differs
considerably from the majority of graph objects sampled [9].
Fast flux networks are a good example of such outliers seen
in empirical DNS graph mining applications.
To answer to the two questions, the remainder of this paper
first briefly revisits the scholarly background in Section II,
proceeding to discuss operationalization in Section III as
a preparation for the empirical experiment in Section IV.
Conclusions and discussion follow in Section V.
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II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The scholarly background behind the concept of DNS
agility has been strongly motivated by network security [1].
By and large, the same applies to empirical DNS graph mining
approaches. Therefore, the following discussion incrementally
proceeds from the fast flux context to the measurement aspects.
A. Flux Types
The so-called fast flux networks refer to a bundle of
largely unknown networking algorithms used to rapidly shuffle
domain-address mappings in order to evade detection, improve
reliability, and to control a botnet or other malicious network.
1) Domain and Address Fluxing: It is possible to separate
domain name and IP address agility from each other [10]. The
former (a.k.a. domain fluxing) refers to rapid generation of
domain names algorithmically. The notorious Conficker worm
is likely the earliest known historical example of a network us-
ing this technique—the underlying botnet that was constructed
via worm-like infections eventually generated even up to fifty
thousand domain names each day [6], [10]. Thereafter, these
domain generation algorithms (DGAs) have been successfully
used in a number of high-profile botnets, including such
technically sophisticated but morbid cases as Rustock [11]
and Gameover ZeuS [12], as well as in related malware
implementations such as the CryptoLocker ransomware [13].
Although no DGAs are supposedly present in the empirical
experiment, it goes without saying that the potential presence
of DGAs may induce a severe bias for DNS graph mining due
to the dynamic addition of vertices, including those vertices
that are labeled to represent domain names.
Clearly, DGAs are generally only applicable for character-
izing malicious agility; no legitimate DNS solution should
generate thousands of domain names, and then pick one of
these for a brief communication session with a command-
and-control unit by activating and subsequently deactivating
the associated DNS records [14]. In this paper, however, the
interest is to observe the latter type of DNS agility (a.k.a. IP
address fluxing); that is, the dynamic mapping of multiple IP
addresses to a single fully qualified domain name. This type
of fluxing is common for both legitimate and malicious agility.
2) Fluxing by Record Types: The fast flux phenomenon
was historically related to (address) fluxing of IPv4 addresses
(a.k.a. A records). Soon after the discovery of this type of
fluxing, malicious networks were observed to also shuffle their
name server (NS) records, adding the concept of “double
fluxing” to the scholarly literature [7], [15], [16]. A network
architecture for double fluxing can be complex. For instance,
sometimes the compromised hosts may carry their own ma-
licious DNS servers, which enables a highly customizable
network for communication, control, and reliability.
Although single and double fluxing with A and NS records
have supposedly remained the mainstream of malicious DNS
agility, the versatility of DNS has continued to offer many
further possibilities for protocol misuse. To provide further
obfuscation guards against detection, DNS tunneling is pos-
sible via the text (TXT) records [17], [18]. These tunneling
techniques provide further covert channels particularly for
the command and control aspects. Also AAAA records may
be used for address fluxing [19], which also motivates the
inclusion of IPv6 in the empirical experiment.
B. Quantities
The seminal fast flux work of Holz and associates [4]
considered two “unaggregated” DNS quantities alongside one
“aggregated” one. The unaggregated and aggregated quantities
are, respectively: the number of unique A records (IPv4
addresses), the number of unique NS records, and the number
of unique autonomous system numbers for all of the A records.
To elaborate the metrics derived from the unaggregated quan-
tities, a couple of clarifications should be made beforehand.
1) Aggregation: In this paper the focus is restricted to the
“unaggregated” level, but only in the sense that no attempts are
made to analyze DNS agility at the level of larger aggregates,
including subnets, IP address blocks [1], and even Internet
registries. The same applies to FQDNs. While “aggregation”
to the second highest level (cf. xboxlive.com) is used
for one sample in the experiment, which is a common
practice in DNS mining [20], [21], the analysis uses also
a sample containing “unaggregated” domains. For instance,
one observed FQDN is download.gfwl.xboxlive.com,
which, through numerous canonical name records (CNAMEs),
is aliased to a content delivery network.
2) Time: It is also important to understand that the study
time refers to i = 1, . . . , q iteratively made DNS queries from
a local resolver, using live DNS for the resolving. In other
words, the study time operates with a client-side perspective
to DNS, using simple polling to obtain the record sets [22].
Unlike with comparable query engines [15], the polling proce-
dure ignores caching and bypasses questions related to time-
to-live (TTL) values for the record sets obtained. This said,
with small alterations, an equivalent analysis could be carried
out also with flow data from DNS servers.
Depending on a bookkeeping solution, each resolving round
can be assumed to contain also one or more timestamps in
the calendar time [22]. If ti is fixed to the integer-valued
timestamp at which the i:th query completed, the magnitudes
in this strictly monotonic time sequence,
(t1, . . . , ti, . . . , tq), ti ∈ N, ti < ti+1 for all 1 ≤ i < q, (1)
depend on local infrastructural factors, including bandwidth
and the software solution used for resolving. Consequently, the
calendar time is generally irregular. Akin to the initial fast flux
work [4], this paper does not explicitly observe (1), however,
and also the t-indices are therefore omitted for convenience.
C. Fluxiness and Cumulative Counts
To measure the dynamics, the fluxiness of a domain has
been operationalized as the number of all unique A records
in a fixed learning period divided by the A records returned
by a single DNS lookup of a given domain name [4]. In
theory the same operationalization applies to all conventional
DNS records returned for a given resource record type, but in
this paper the focus is on the conventional A records (IPv4
addresses) and AAAA records (IPv6 addresses). To fix the
basic idea as well as the notation, let Ri denote a set of unique
DNS records of specific type returned for the i:th query:
Ri ∈ {Ai, AAAAi}. (2)
To use one of the private address space networks from RFC
1918 as an example, a couple of queries could return
Ai = {10.0.0.1,10.0.0.254} and (3)
Ai+1 = {10.0.0.1,10.0.0.2,10.0.0.254},
such that |Ai| = 2 and |Ai+1| = 3. This small private example
network would be agile in the sense that the fluxiness score
3/2 = 1.5 for the i:th query did not equal unity. If Ai+2 would
subsequently equal ∅, such that |Ai+2| = 0, the (i+2):th query
could have resulted a so-called NXDOMAIN case, that is, the
domain would not have resolved to any IPv4 address. As said,
timeouts and other errors may be equally likely in practice.
With this notation, the fluxiness of a domain at the i:th
query round can be defined with a function
ϕRi = f(Ri, R) =
{
0 if Ri = ∅,
|R| / |Ri| otherwise,
(4)
where
R = R1 ∪R2 ∪ · · · ∪Rq (5)
refers to all records obtained through q queries. For legitimate
agile DNS, the later values in a vector
ϕR = (ϕR1 , . . . , ϕRi , ϕRi+1 , . . . , ϕRq ) (6)
can be hypothesized to converge relatively fast to a fixed scalar,
while slower convergence should be expected for malicious
fast flux networks [4]. In other words, it should be generally
easier to learn the record sets for legitimate agile DNS com-
pared to malicious agility. Alternatively, the record cumulation
φR = (|R1|, |R1 ∪R2|, . . . , |R1 ∪ · · · ∪Rq|) (7)
should display a slowly decelerating but diverging growth
curves for legitimate and malicious fluxing [4]. Both ϕR and
φR can be also used for probing agile domains in general.
III. MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK
The paper investigates the effect of particularly (7) upon
the learning and sampling of DNS graphs. Before proceeding
to elaborate the agility bias, a brief discussion is required for
demonstrating the use of the two fast flux metrics in practice,
and for introducing the construction of bipartite DNS graphs.
A. Degrees of Agility
There exists no single criterion according to which domains
could be labeled as agile and non-agile or static and dynamic.
When q → ∞, some changes are bound to happen due to
infrastructural changes—if only when tq in (1) denotes a
sufficiently large integer with respect to t1, such that tq − t1
amounts to a few years, say. Nevertheless, at minimum, an
agile domain should satisfy the following exclusion condition:
c(τ) : # of unique values in φR ≥ τ, 0 < τ ∈ N, (8)
for a threshold value τ = 2. In other words, at minimum the
size of R must be larger than one for a change to be possible
to begin with. This same c(2) condition is also equivalent to
saying that the standard deviation of φR should be non-zero.
To demonstrate the criterion and the unaggregated fast flux
metrics in practice, consider the four plots in Fig. 1, which
are based on a dataset described later in Section IV-A. The
solid and dashed lines in the figure refer to (7) and (6) for
IPv4 addresses, or φA and ϕA, respectively.
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Fig. 1. A 4-Tuple of Agile Domains (sampled from [23])
The four visualized domains are clearly agile; there were
changes throughout the q = 3000 resolving rounds repre-
sented on the x-axes. But while all four domains are agile
in one sense or another, the degree of agility varies wildly
between the domains. The two plots in the top row ex-
hibit rather irregular, stochastic-looking fluxing. The domain
secured.cdnawbeast.us, as visualized in the bottom-
right plot, exhibits rather extreme agility of different kind by
constantly, almost round by round, resolving to either one
or two addresses. Despite of these rapid dynamics, however,
the cumulative vector φA is easy to learn for these domains.
In fact, the three thousand resolving rounds were clearly
wasteful for learning the domain-address mappings: for all
four domains in Fig. 1, the cumulative IPv4 address counts
remained constant throughout the resolving rounds.
Both ϕR and φR may remain constant around a single
unique value. If all records were learned already during the
first round, such that |R| in (5) equals |R1|, the cumulative
counts in the vector φR in (7) would all equal the single
unique integer |R1|. Likewise, ϕR may remain constant. For
instance, consider a domain that resolves to two new IPv4s
in each i = 1, 2, 3 resolving rounds. For such a domain,
the function (4) results 6/2 = 3 for each round yet still
φA = (2, 4, 6). Constant fluxiness scores are also easily
demonstrated empirically. An analogous empirical case is
thus illustrated in the top-left plot of Fig. 2 by using the
same dataset. This CDN domain cdn3.opencandy.com
resolved very slowly to six IPv4 addresses—yet the fluxiness
scores remained constant throughout the resolving rounds.1
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Fig. 2. Further Agile Domains (sampled from [23])
When moving to the top-right plot, it becomes evident
that also IPv6 addresses may be agile. Moreover, the two
bottom row plots both satisfy c(630). In other words,
more than 21 percent (out of q = 3000) of the resolv-
ing rounds added a new unique IPv4 address to the cu-
mulative A record sets of files.opencandy.com and
setup.roblox.com. Although not that visible from the
plots, φA still follows a step function also for these two
domains. The lengths between the steps—the number of
resolving rounds that resulted the same unique cumulative
count—only widen toward the end of the series, however. It is
also worth noting that cdn3.opencandy.com is an alias to
cdn.opencandy.edgesuite.net, which is an alias to
a domain underneath Akamai’s akamai.net. Furthermore,
both files.opencandy.com and setup.roblox.com
are aliased to Amazon Web Services. Particularly these two
cloud-powered domains spotlight important implications for
DNS graph mining—clearly, already the shape of the growth
curves indicate the presence of a serious bias for “static”
graphs learned with q = 1. In fact, even the q = 3000
choice may not have been enough for learning the addresses
dynamically mapped to the bottom row domains in Fig. 2.
1 According to Wikipedia, “the OpenCandy ecosystem” related to adware.
B. DNS Graphs in Brief
A typical—but by no means unique [24]—DNS graph is
undirected and bipartite, connecting fully qualified domain
names to their IP addresses [1], [16], [25]. The basic idea
remains similar for server-side applications, although these
allow further separating the “inside” (origins of queries) and
“outside” (targets of queries) traffic passing through DNS
servers, routers, or related machinery [26], [27], [28], [29].
Given the client-side perspective adopted for this paper, the
underlying graph structure can be denoted with
GR = (VD ∪ VR, E), (9)
where GR denotes an R-type DNS graph given (2), VD and
VR are ordered vertex sets of the observed FQDNs and R-type
DNS records, respectively, and E is a set of edges that connect
elements in VD to elements in VR. That is, the edge set E
means that there is a relation E ⊆ {(v, u) | v ∈ VD, u ∈ VR}
between all R-type DNS records u ∈ VR to which a domain
v ∈ VD resolved at i. In addition, a bookkeeping set, say BR,
is kept for recording the resolving round at which an R-type
DNS record was added to the vertex set VR. It follows that
|VR| = |BR| and b ≤ q for any positive integer b ∈ BR. This
bookkeeping conveys the dynamic construction of a GR.
Vertices and edges are added dynamically to GR according
to the resolving rounds. That is, for each i, new vertices
and edges are added to the graph in case these were not
already previously added to the graph. To illustrate: for
the small IPv4 example (i.e., R = A) in (3), at the i:th
resolving round there would be a single domain name ver-
tex v ∈ VD, which would be connected to two IPv4 ad-
dress vertices, such that VA = (10.0.0.1,10.0.0.254),
(v,10.0.0.1) ∈ E, and (v,10.0.0.254) ∈ E. The sub-
sequent round with Ai+1 would result a slightly larger graph,
such that VA = (10.0.0.1,10.0.0.254,10.0.0.2).
For this example, BA = (i, i, i+1) because the IPv4 addresses
10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.254 were added to VA during the
i:th round, while the next round added also 10.0.0.2.
This dynamic addition of vertices and edges catalyzes
to the learning process in DNS graph mining [16]. In a
typical data mining application, the vertices and edges are
added iteratively either during resolving or afterwards with an
order-preserving database collection. When all i = 1, . . . , q
resolving rounds have been processed, the resulting graph can
be called a “learned graph”. Once such a learned graph is
available, an observable relational representation is also ready
for empirically evaluating the contextual questions of interest.
Given the ever so slow adoption rate of the IPv6 protocol, an
AAAA-based bipartite DNS graph offers a good small case for
further illustrating the bookkeeping structure. Consider thus
Fig. 3, which shows a learned graph for all IPv6 addresses in
the previously noted dataset. Each rectangle denotes a FQDN
in VD, while IPv6 addresses in VAAAA are represented by
darker colored circles. Instead of using the labels for the
AAAA records, each of the circles is labeled with the given
b ∈ BAAAA, that is, these labels represent the resolving round
at which a given IPv6 address vertex was added to the graph.
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Fig. 3. A DNS Graph (learned GAAAA; sampled from [23])
As can be seen, the graph is small due to the large amount of
domains without active IPv6 addresses. Interestingly, though,
many of the shown domains satisfy c(2), meaning that the
domains eventually resolved to more than one IPv6 address.
As an interesting further detail, one AAAA record was also
mapped to three domains. More importantly, however, the
resolving round integers visualized within the circles indicate
that particularly two IPv6 addresses were learned relatively
late. From these two domains, the one at the center of the graph
is the same pad.okozo.com that was already visualized
in the top-right plot in Fig. 2. Both figures also convey the
same message in terms of the agility bias: if the resolving
would have been stopped at q = 100, say, the learned GAAAA
would have missed two vertices in VAAAA and two edges in E,
although VD would have been unaffected. Thus, the bias would
have been rather small. Another way to look at the agility bias
relates to the sampling characteristics. If a sample contains
extreme cases like the two bottom row domains in Fig. 2, the
bias is likely a result from outliers rather than overall agility.
C. The Agility Bias
Agility bias is understood to refer to the statistical effect of
the dynamic domain-address mappings upon the construction
and underlying quantifiable characteristics of a DNS graph. To
study the effects, two different biases are considered next.
1) Learning Bias: The first bias is used to examine the
effect of DNS agility on the longitudinal learning of a DNS
graph. To carry out the empirical evaluation, an already learned
GR is pruned by iteratively removing vertices and edges in two
steps. For each j = 1, . . . , q, (a) a subset of R-type vertices
SRj = {v | v ∈ VR, b ∈ BR, b > j}, SRj ⊆ VRj , (10)
is removed from GRj . In terms of the GAAAA graph in Fig. 3,
the first iteration at j = 1 removes |SAAAA1 | = 3 vertices,
for instance. To account for the potential disconnected domain
name vertices, (b) the graph is pruned afterwards at each step
by removing all unconnected vertices with a degree of zero.
Thus, the learning bias answers to a “what if” question; how
much information would have been lost if the learning would
have been stopped at some k < q? To answer to the question,
different graph metrics can be applied at each j to a potentially
reduced GRj that has been processed via the twofold routine.
2) Sampling Bias: The sampling bias relates to a different
viewpoint on the biases that agility causes for DNS graph min-
ing. The question asked is: how a learned graph changes when
extremely agile domains are excluded from the graph? The
question and the term sampling both convey a statistical logic:
for instance, if the intention would be to study a sample of
non-agile domains resolving to their single unique addresses,
even a single case misselection, such as the inclusion of a
CDN-powered domain, can cause a severe bias—insofar as the
sample should represent a population of non-agile domains.
To measure this kind of a sampling bias, for each domain,
the exclusion criteria in (8) is iterated according to a sequence
of threshold scalars τj ∈ (1, 2, . . . , τm), j ≤ m, (a) removing
the corresponding FQDN vertices in VD for which a given
c(τj) is not satisfied. It is worth noting that this reduction is
exactly the same as removing vertices iteratively according to
an ordered vector of degrees for all v ∈ VD. Analogously
to the learning bias, (b) disconnected vertices are afterwards
pruned from the processed GRj . Finally, to fix the iteration,
τm is set to the maximum number of unique values in φR.
When considering the agile files.opencandy.com
and setup.roblox.com cases in Fig. 2, an important
question is whether there even is a saturation point for the
visualized cumulative counts. While the plots allow to question
whether the saturation was reached with q = 3000, the answer
should still be negative; the counts should not grow without
bound [7]. That is, the elaborated sampling bias should not
be expected to tend to infinity. While speculating about the
actual upper bounds is beyond the scope of this paper, it can
be noted that the address pools may not be overly large in
current CDNs [30]. Fast flux networks are a different beast.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The empirical experiment is carried out by examining the
elaborated agility biases for DNS graphs constructed for
two separate domain name collections. Before turning to the
results, these two FQDN samples should be briefly elaborated.
A. Data and Sampling
The first, large sample refers to a single snapshot obtained
from the list maintained by OpenDNS (Cisco) for weekly
tracking of the most popular domains queried through the open
DNS resolvers of OpenDNS [31]. The list is updated weekly,
each weekly snapshot containing ten thousand domains. The
second sample comes from the commonly used (e.g., [28])
malc0de domain name collection [23], which is maintained for
keeping track of malware files downloaded from the Internet.
Although the “benign-versus-malicious” split should be
always done with care [32], the two samples can be still
characterized to reflect “popular” and “suspicious” domains.
No profiling or other attempts were done to evaluate whether
the latter sample would actually contain malicious fast flux
networks. As already elaborated, the sample contains content
delivery networks and cloud-based domains, nevertheless.
While only one weekly snapshot is used, the OpenDNS
sample enlarges to a very large dataset because each of the
ten thousand domains were queried for nine hundred times
with a custom client-side resolver [22]. As can be seen from
the summary in Table I, also the resolving took a rather
long time due to infrastructural and related reasons noted in
Section II-B2. This, said, the calendar time in (1) is also
affected by the ten minute waiting time between resolving
rounds in the OpenDNS sample. In contrast, the malc0de
sample was resolved with only one minute waiting time.
TABLE I
EMPIRICAL SAMPLES
Sample
1. OpenDNS [31] 2. malc0de [23]
Context Popularity Malware
Resolver OpenDNS Local ISP
Domainsa 10,000 283
Resolving rounds 900 3000
Time delayb 10 1
Start of resolving 29-5-2016 9:35 29-6-2016 8:19
End of resolving 21-6-2016 10:59 5-7-2016 18:45
Aggregation To the 2nd highest level No (raw FQDNs)
a From these, only domains that resolved to one or more A or AAAA records are
added to the observed GA and GAAAA graphs; b the delay refers to a waiting time
(in minutes) between each consecutive resolving round via the reported resolvers.
The OpenDNS and malc0de samples were resolved through
live DNS by using the resolvers provided by OpenDNS and a
local Internet service provider (ISP). Although a large number
of records were obtained, the results are presented by focusing
on the “pure” DNS graphs comprised of IP addresses and
FQDNs. While a domain can obviously have both IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses, the analysis is carried out separately for A
and AAAA records in order to tentatively evaluate whether the
agility biases may generally vary across the two IP versions.
B. Results
All learned graphs are very sparse, although, interestingly,
the learned IPv6 less so (see Table II). The share of domains
to IPv4 addresses, |VD|/|VR| × 100, is about 39 % and 16 %
for the OpenDNS and malc0de samples, respectively, meaning
that both samples are generally comprised of agile domains.
Moreover, both GAAAA graphs are rather small, which implies
that care should be used when interpreting the IPv6 results.
The learning biases are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. In
both plots, the first rows refers to IPv4 graphs, while results
for the AAAA graphs are shown in the bottom rows. The
left-hand side plots visualize the number of vertices and
edges, whereas the right-hand shows bipartite graph density,
|E| / |VD|×|VR|. In all plots, the y-axes represent these graph
quantities, whereas the x-axes denote the resolving rounds.
A brief visual inspection reveals the first observation: while
the IPv6 graphs are small for making definite conclusions, the
trends are roughly similar between the two IP versions. The
learning bias in the malc0de sample follows a highly similar
TABLE II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (LEARNED GRAPHS)
Sample
1. OpenDNS [31] 2. malc0de [23]
Vertices 29946 2063
Edges 64472 1902
Density 0.0004 0.0038
Vertices 2911 23
Edges 5859 16
Density 0.0048 0.1270
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Fig. 5. Learning Bias for the OpenDNS Sample
curve than the one shown earlier for the two highly agile
bottom-row domains in Fig. 2. Due to the general sparsity of
DNS graphs, the density for the reduced FQDN-IPv4 graphs
declines as learning increases in the malc0de graph, which
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Fig. 7. Sampling Bias for the OpenDNS Sample
implies that domains and addresses are constantly added to
the graph but in a way that does not connect domain vertices
through address vertices. In other words, not many of the
domains resolve to IPv4s to which also other domains resolve.
The contrary applies to the OpenDNS learning bias in Fig. 5.
In particular, the top-left plot indicates that learning mostly
involves adding new edges in this sample (cf. the red line).
Although also new IPv4 addresses are constantly added, the
growth rate of the vertex sets is still modest (cf. the blue
line). This observation is largely explained by the nature of
the sample. Because the dataset contains some of the busiest
domains in the Internet, which are mostly served via CDNs
and other cloud-based solutions, the IPv4 addresses are learned
relatively quickly, and these addresses (or address pools) are
used to serve multiple domains in the sample. To summarize,
the learning bias can be severe for both samples. If the
learning would have been stopped at q = 100, for instance, the
OpenDNS sample would have missed a considerable amount
of edges in particular, and the malc0de sample a considerable
amount of both edges and IPv4 vertices.
Turing now to the sampling biases, the top-left plot in
Fig. 6 shows that the bias in the malc0de sample is largely
a result from the few highly agile, outlying domains. When
domains are removed according to the number of their
unique A records, the amount of vertices and edges drops
sharply relatively early, remaining almost constant thereafter.
Therefore, the increasing learning bias in the top-left plot
in Fig. 4 is largely a result from learning the A records
of the outliers, including files.opencandy.com and
setup.roblox.com in Fig. 2. The sampling biases are less
pronounced in the OpenDNS sample (see Fig. 7), although a
similar pattern is present. All in all, also the sampling bias can
be severe: a few extremely agile domains can easily dominate
the structure of an otherwise relatively stable DNS graph.
V. DISCUSSION
This empirical paper examined a so-called agility bias for
DNS graph mining with two questions: how many resolv-
ing rounds are generally required for constructing domain-
address mappings (learning bias), and what is the statistical
effect of highly agile domains (sampling bias)? The answers
to these two questions is largely in line with the existing
recommendation of a two week learning period for typical
DNS graph mining applications [1]. In terms of the pseudo-
time resolving rounds, the q = 3000 choice used in the
paper seems to provide a decent enough benchmark for client-
side applications, amounting roughly to two weeks or less. In
other words, a rather long period is required even for simple
applied questions. To continue the work on mapping of CDN
edge server addresses [5], a good question for further research
would be to examine the potential for an optimal threshold.
When DNS graphs are constructed from server-side flow
data in terms of source and destination addresses (see, e.g.,
[26], [33], [34]), it should be kept in mind that the destination
addresses may be highly dynamic and volatile even though
the clients’ source addresses may be stable [20] or even
entirely static. For such applications, the commonly used (see,
e.g., [27], [28], [29]) alternative bipartite representations based
on client (source) addresses and queried domains (instead of
their addresses) may be more robust for measurement.
All in all, a word of warning can be reasonably reserved for
DNS graph mining applications that utilize short learning peri-
ods. The severity of the agility bias varies from an application
context to another. For instance, malware is often dropped
to different file-sharing cloud services [32], which typically
utilize either their own agility solutions or outsource the
agility to CDNs. Consequently, the agility bias is presumably
pronounced in DNS-based malware research, which likely
translates to inaccuracies and other issues in machine learning
applications for classifying benign and malicious domains.
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